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Abstract
This paper is about the flow of inference between
communicative intentions, discourse structure and
the domain during discourse processing. We aug-
ment a theory of discourse interpretation with a
theory of distinct mental attitudes and reasoning
about them, in order to provide an account of how
the attitudes interact with reasoning about dis-
course structure.
INTRODUCTION
The flow of inference between communicative in-
tentions and domain information is often essential
to discourse processing. It is well reflected in this
discourse from Moore and Pollack (1992):
(1)a.George Bush supports big business.
b.He’s sure to veto House Bill 1711.
There are at least three different interpretations.
Consider Context 1: in this context the interpreter
I believes that the author A wants to convince him
that (1b) is true. For example, the context is one
in which I has already uttered Bush won’t veto any
more bills. I reasons that A’s linguistic behavior
was intentional, and therefore that A believes that
by saying (1a) he will convince I that Bush will
veto the bill. Even if I believed nothing about the
bill, he now infers it’s bad for big business. So
we have witnessed an inference from premises that
involve the desires and beliefs of A (Moore and
Pollack’s “intentional structure”), as well as his
linguistic behavior, to a conclusion about domain
information (Moore and Pollack’s “informational
structure”).
Now consider Context 2: in this context I knows
that A wants to convince him of (1a). As in Con-
text 1, I may infer that the bill is bad for big busi-
ness. But now, (1b) is used to support (1a).
Finally, consider Context 3: in this context I
knows that House Bill 1711 is bad for big business,
but doesn’t know A’s communicative desires prior
to witnessing his linguistic behaviour. From his be-
liefs about the domain, he infers that supporting
big business would cause Bush to veto this bill. So,
A must have uttered (1a) to support (1b). Hence
I realises that A wanted him to believe (1b). So in
contrast to Contexts 1 and 2, we have a flow of in-
ference from informational structure to intentional
structure.
This story makes two main points. First, we
agree with Moore and Pollack that we must repre-
sent both the intentional import and the informa-
tional import of a discourse. As they show, this
is a problem for current formulations of Rhetori-
cal Structure Theory (rst) (Thompson and Mann,
1987). Second, we go further than Moore and Pol-
lack, and argue that reasoning about beliefs and
desires exploits different rules and axioms from
those used to infer rhetorical relations. Thus,
we should represent intentional structure and dis-
course structure separately. But we postulate
rhetorical relations that express the discourse func-
tion of the constituents in the communicative plan
of the author, and we permit interaction between
reasoning about rhetorical relations and reasoning
about beliefs and desires.
This paper provides the first steps towards a
formal analysis of the interaction between inten-
tional structure and informational structure. Our
framework for discourse structure analysis is sdrt
(Asher 1993). The basic representational struc-
tures of that theory may be used to characterise
cognitive states. We will extend the logical en-
gine used to infer rhetorical relations—dice (Las-
carides and Asher 1991, 1993a, 1993b, Lascarides
and Oberlander 1993)—to model inferences about
intentional structure and its interaction with infor-
mational structure.
BUSH’S REQUIREMENTS
We must represent both the intentional import and
the informational import of a discourse simultane-
ously. So we need a theory of discourse structure
where discourse relations central to intentional im-
port and to informational import can hold simul-
taneously between the same constituents. A logi-
cal framework in which all those plausible relations
between constituents that are consistent with each
other are inferred, such as a nonmonotonic logic
like that in dice (Lascarides and Asher, 1993a),
would achieve this. So conceivably, a similar non-
monotonic logic for rst might solve the problem of
keeping track of the intentional and informational
structure simultaneously.
But this would work only if the various discourse
relations about intentions and information could
simultaneously hold in a consistent knowledge base
(kb). Moore and Pollack (1992) show via discourse
(2) that the current commitment to the nucleus-
satellite distinction in rst precludes this.
(2)a.Let’s go home by 5.
b.Then we can get to the hardware store
before it closes.
c. That way we can finish the bookshelves
tonight.
From an intentional perspective, (2b) is a satel-
lite to (2a) via Motivation. From an informational
perspective, (2a) is a satellite to (2b) via Condi-
tion. These two structures are incompatible. So
augmenting rst with a nonmonotonic logic for in-
ferring rhetorical relations would not yield a rep-
resentation of (2) on multiple levels in which both
intentional and informational relations are repre-
sented. In sdrt, on the other hand, not all dis-
course relations induce subordination, and so there
is more scope for different discourse relations hold-
ing simultaneously in a consistent kb.
Grosz and Sidner’s (1986) model of discourse in-
terpretation is one where the same discourse el-
ements are related simultaneously on the infor-
mational and intentional levels. But using their
framework to model (1) is not straightforward. As
Grosz and Sidner (1990) point out: “any model (or
theory) of the communication situation must dis-
tinguish among beliefs and intentions of different
agents,” but theirs does not. They represent in-
tentional structure as a stack of propositions, and
different attitudes aren’t distinguished. The infor-
mal analysis of (1) above demands such distinc-
tions, however. For example, analysing (1) under
Context 3 requires a representation of the following
statement: since A has provided a reason why (1b)
is true, he must want I to believe that (1b) is true.
It’s unclear how Grosz and Sidner would represent
this. sdrt (Asher, 1993) is in a good position to
be integrated with a theory of cognitive states, be-
cause it uses the same basic structures (discourse
representation structures or drss) that have been
used in Discourse Representation Theory (drt) to
represent different attitudes like beliefs and desires
(Kamp 1981, Asher 1986, 1987, Kamp 1991, Asher
and Singh, 1993).
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO
SDRT AND DICE
In sdrt (Asher, 1993), an nl text is represented
by a segmented drs (sdrs), which is a pair of
sets containing: the drss or sdrss representing
respectively sentences and text segments, and dis-
course relations between them. Discourse rela-
tions, modelled after those proposed by Hobbs
(1985), Polanyi (1985) and Thompson and Mann
(1987), link together the constituents of an sdrs.
We will mention three: Narration, Result and Ev-
idence.
sdrss have a hierarchical configuration, and
sdrt predicts points of attachment in a discourse
structure for new information. Using dice we infer
from the reader’s knowledge resources which dis-
course relation should be used to do attachment.
Lascarides and Asher (1991) introduce default
rules representing the role of Gricean pragmatic
maxims and domain knowledge in calculating the
value of the update function 〈τ, α, β〉, which means
“the representation β of the current sentence is
to be attached to α with a discourse relation,
where α is an open node in the representation τ
of the text so far”. Defaults are represented by
a conditional—φ > ψ means ‘if φ, then normally
ψ. For example, Narration says that by default
Narration relates elements in a text.
• Narration: 〈τ, α, β〉 > Narration(α, β)
Associated axioms show how Narration affects the
temporal order of the events described: Narration
and the corresponding temporal axioms on Nar-
ration predict that normally the textual order of
events matches their temporal order.
The logic on which dice rests is Asher and Mor-
reau’s (1991) Commonsense Entailment (ce). Two
patterns of nonmonotonic inference are particu-
larly relevant here. The first is Defeasible Modus
Ponens: if one default rule has its antecedent ver-
ified, then the consequent is nonmonotonically in-
ferred. The second is the Penguin Principle: if
there are conflicting default rules that apply, and
their antecedents are in logical entailment rela-
tions, then the consequent of the rule with the
most specific antecedent is inferred. Lascarides
and Asher (1991) use dice to yield the discourse
structures and temporal structures for simple dis-
courses. But the theory has so far ignored how
A’s intentional structure—or more accurately, I’s
model of A’s intentional structure—influences I’s
inferences about the domain and the discourse
structure.
ADDING INTENTIONS
To discuss intentional structure, we develop a lan-
guage which can express beliefs, intentions and de-
sires. Following Bratman (forthcoming) and Asher
and Singh (1993), we think of the objects of atti-
tudes either as plans or as propositions. For ex-
ample, the colloquial intention to do something—
like wash the dishes—will be expressed as an in-
tention toward a plan, whereas the intention that
Sue be happy is an intention toward a proposi-
tion. Plans will just consist of sequences of basic
actions a1; a2; . . . ; an. Two operators—R for about
to do or doing, and D for having done—will con-
vert actions into propositions. The attitudes we
assume in our model are believes (BAφ means ‘A
believes φ’), wants (WAφ means ‘A wants φ’), and
intends (IAφ means ‘A intends φ’). All of this
takes place in a modal, dynamic logic, where the
propositional attitudes are supplied with a modal
semantics. To this we add the modal conditional
operator >, upon which the logic of dice is based.
Let’s take a closer look at (1) in Context 1. Let
the logical forms of the sentences (1a) and (1b)
be respectively α and β. In Context 1, I believes
that A wants to convince him of β and thinks that
he doesn’t believe β already. Following the drt
analysis of attitudes, we assume I’s cognitive state
has embedded in it a model of A’s cognitive state,
which in turn has a representation of I’s cogni-
tive state. So WABIβ and BA¬BIβ hold in I’s
kb. Furthermore, 〈τ, α, β〉 ∧ Info(α, β) holds in I’s
kb, where Info(α, β) is a gloss for the semantic
content of α and β that I knows about.1 I must
now reason about what A intended by his partic-
ular discourse action. I is thus presented with a
classical reasoning problem about attitudes: how
to derive what a person believes, from a knowl-
edge of what he wants and an observation of his
behaviour. The classic means of constructing such
a derivation uses the practical syllogism, a form of
reasoning about action familiar since Aristotle. It
expresses the following maxim: Act so as to realize
your goals ceteris paribus.
The practical syllogism is a rule of defeasible rea-
soning, expressible in ce by means of the non-
monotonic consequence relation |≈. The conse-
quence relation φ|≈ψ can be stated directly in the
object language of ce by a formula which we ab-
breviate as ⊥(φ,ψ) (Asher 1993). We use ⊥(φ,ψ) to
state the practical syllogism. First, we define the
notion that the kb and φ, but not the kb alone,
nonmonotonically yield ψ:
• Definition:
⊥kb(φ,ψ)↔⊥(KB ∧ φ,ψ) ∧ ¬ ⊥(KB,ψ)
The Practical Syllogism says that if (a) A wants φ
but believes it’s not true, and (b) he knows that if
1This doesn’t necessarily include that House Bill 1711 is
bad for big business.
ψ were added to his kb it would by default make
φ true eventually, then by default A intends ψ.
• The Practical Syllogism:
(a) (WA(φ) ∧ BA(¬φ)∧
(b) BA(⊥kb(ψ, eventually(φ)))) >
(c) IA(ψ)
The Practical Syllogism enables I to reason
about A’s cognitive state. In Context 1, when sub-
stituting in the Practical Syllogism BIβ for φ, and
〈τ, α, β〉 ∧ Info(α, β) for ψ, we find that clause (a)
of the antecedent to the Practical Syllogism is ver-
ified. The conclusion (c) is also verified, because
I assumes that A’s discourse act was intentional.
This assumption could be expressed explicitly as a
>-rule, but we will not do so here.
Now, abduction (i.e., explanatory reasoning) as
well as nonmonotonic deduction is permitted on
the Practical Syllogism. So from knowing (a) and
(c), I can conclude the premise (b). We can state
in ce an ‘abductive’ rule based on the Practical
Syllogism:
• The Abductive Practical Syllogism 1
(aps1)
(WA(φ) ∧ BA(¬φ) ∧ IA(ψ)) >
BA(⊥kb(ψ, eventually(φ)))
aps1 allows us to conclude (b) when (a) and (c) of
the Practical Syllogism hold. So, the intended ac-
tion ψ must be one that A believes will eventually
make φ true.
When we make the same substitutions for φ
and ψ in aps1 as before, I will infer the conclu-
sion of aps1 via Defeasible Modus Ponens: BA(⊥
kb(〈τ, α, β〉 ∧ Info(α, β), eventually(BIβ))). That is,
I infers that A believes that, by uttering what he
did, I will come to believe β.
In general, there may be a variety of alternatives
that we could use to substitute for φ and ψ in
aps1, in a given situation. For usually, there are
choices on what can be abduced. The problem of
choice is one that Hobbs et al. (1990) address by
a complex weighting mechanism. We could adopt
this approach here.
The Practical Syllogism and aps1 differ in two
important ways from the dice axioms concerning
discourse relations. First, aps1 is motivated by
an abductive line of reasoning on a pattern of de-
feasible reasoning involving cognitive states. The
dice axioms are not. Secondly, both the Practi-
cal Syllogism and aps1 don’t include the discourse
update function 〈τ, α, β〉 together with some infor-
mation about the semantic content of α and β in
the antecedent, while this is a standard feature of
the dice axioms for inferring discourse structure.
These two differences distinguish reasoning
about intentional structures and discourse struc-
tures. But discourse structure is linked to inten-
tional structure in the following way. The above
reasoning with A’s cognitive state has led I to con-
clusions about the discourse function of α. Intu-
itively, α was uttered to support β, or α ‘intention-
ally supports’ β. This idea of intentional support
is defined in dice as follows:
• Intends to Support:
Isupport(α, β)↔ (WA(BIβ) ∧ BA(¬BIβ) ∧
BA(⊥
kbh(〈τ, α, β〉 ∧ Info(α, β), eventually(BIβ))))
In words, α intentionally supports β if and only if
A wants I to believe β and doesn’t think he does so
already, and he also believes that by uttering α and
β together, so that I is forced to reason about how
they should be attached with a rhetorical relation,
I will come to believe β.
Isupport(α, β) defines a relationship between α
and β at the discourse structural level, in terms
of I’s and A’s cognitive states. With it we in-
fer further information about the particular dis-
course relation that I should use to attach β to
α. Isupport(α, β) provides the link between rea-
soning about cognitive states and reasoning about
discourse structure.
Let us now return to the interpretation of (1)
under Context 1. I concludes Isupport(α, β), be-
cause the right hand side of the ↔-condition in
Intends to Support is satisfied. So I passes from a
problem of reasoning about A’s intentional struc-
ture to one of reasoning about discourse structure.
Now, I should check to see whether α actually
does lead him to believe β. This is a check on
the coherence of discourse; in order for an sdrs τ
to be coherent, the discourse relations predicated
of the constituents must be satisfiable.2 Here, this
amounts to justifying A’s belief that given the dis-
course context and I’s background beliefs of which
A is aware, I will arrive at the desired conclusion—
that he believes β. So, I must be able to infer
a particular discourse relation R between α and
β that has what we will call the Belief Property:
(BIα ∧ R(α, β)) > BIβ. That is, R must be a re-
lation that would indeed license I’s concluding β
from α.
We concentrate here for illustrative purposes on
two discourse relations with the Belief Property:
Result(α, β) and Evidence(α, β); or in other words,
α results in β, or α is evidence for β.
• Relations with the Belief Property:
(BIα ∧ Evidence(α, β)) > BIβ
(BIα ∧ Result(α, β)) > BIβ
The following axiom of Cooperation captures the
above reasoning on I’s part: if α Isupports β,
then it must be possible to infer from the semantic
content, that either Result(α, β) or Evidence(α, β)
hold:
• Cooperation:
(Isupport(α, β) ∧ 〈τ, α, β〉) →
(⊥kb(〈τ, α, β〉 ∧ Info(α, β),Result(α, β)) ∨
⊥kb(〈τ, α, β〉 ∧ Info(α, β),Evidence(α, β)))
The intentional structure of A that I has inferred
has restricted the candidate set of discourse rela-
tions that I can use to attach β to α: he must
use Result or Evidence, or both. If I can’t accom-
modate A’s intentions by doing this, then the dis-
course will be incoherent. We’ll shortly show how
Cooperation contributes to the explanation of why
(3) is incoherent.
(3)a.George Bush is a weak-willed president.
b.?He’s sure to veto House Bill 1711.
FROM INTENTIONS TO
INFORMATION:
2Asher (1993) discusses this point in relation to Con-
trast: the discourse marker but is used coherently only if the
semantic content of the constituents it connects do indeed
form a contrast: compare Mary’s hair is black but her eyes
are blue, with ?Mary’s hair is black but John’s hair is black.
CONTEXTS 1 AND 2
The axioms above allow I to use his knowledge of
A’s cognitive state, and the behaviour of A that he
observes, to (a) infer information about A’s com-
municative intentions, and (b) consequently to re-
strict the set of candidate discourse relations that
are permitted between the constituents. According
to Cooperation, I must infer that one of the per-
mitted discourse relations does indeed hold. When
clue words are lacking, the semantic content of the
constituents must be exploited. In certain cases,
it’s also necessary to infer further information that
wasn’t explicitly mentioned in the discourse, in or-
der to sanction the discourse relation. For exam-
ple, in (1) in Contexts 1 and 2, I infers the bill is
bad for big business.
Consider again discourse (1) in Context 1. In-
tuitively, the reason we can infer Result(α, β) in
the analysis of (1) is because (i) α entails a generic
(Bush vetoes bills that are bad for big business),
and (ii) this generic makes β true, as long as we
assume that House Bill 1711 is bad for big busi-
ness.
To define the Result Rule below that cap-
tures this reasoning for discourse attachment,
we first define this generic-instance relationship:
instance(φ,ψ) holds just in case φ is (∀x)(A(x) >
B(x)) and ψ is A[x/d] ∧ B[x/d]. For example,
bird(tweety) ∧ fly(tweety) (Tweety is a bird and
Tweety flies) is an instance of ∀x(bird(x) > fly(x))
(Birds fly).
The Result Rule says that if (a) β is to be at-
tached to α, and α was intended to support β, and
(b) α entails a generic, of which β and δ form an
instance, and (c) δ is consistent with what A and
I believe,3 then normally, δ and Result(α, β) are
inferred.
• The Result Rule:
(a) (〈τ, α, β〉 ∧ Isupport(α, β)∧
(b) ⊥kb∧τ (α, φ)∧ ⊥kb∧τ∧δ(β, ψ) ∧ instance(φ,ψ)∧
(c) consistent(kbI ∪ kbA ∪ δ))
> (Result(α, β) ∧ δ)
The Result Rule does two things. First, it allows us
to infer one discourse relation (Result) from those
3Or, more accurately, δ must be consistent with what I
himself believes, and what he believes that A believes. In
other words, kbA is I ’s model of A’s kb.
permitted by Cooperation. Second, it allows us
to infer a new piece of information δ, in virtue of
which Result(α, β) is true.
We might want further constraints on δ than
that in (c); we might add that δ shouldn’t violate
expectations generated by the text. But note that
the Result Rule doesn’t choose between different
δs that verify clauses (b) and (c). As we’ve men-
tioned, the theory needs to be extended to deal
with the problem of choice, and it may be nec-
essary to adopt strategies for choosing among al-
ternatives, which take factors other than logical
structure into account.
We have a similar rule for inferring
Evidence(β, α) (“β is evidence for α”). The Ev-
idence rule resembles the Result Rule, except that
the textual order of the discourse constituents, and
the direction of intentional support changes:
• The Evidence Rule:
(a) (〈τ, α, β〉 ∧ Isupport(β, α)∧
(b) ⊥kb∧τ (α, φ)∧ ⊥kb∧τ∧δ(β, ψ) ∧ instance(φ,ψ)∧
(c) consistent(kbI ∪ kbA ∪ δ))
> (Evidence(β, α) ∧ δ)
We have seen that clause (a) of the Result Rule is
satisfied in the analysis of (1) in Context 1. Now,
let δ be the proposition that the House Bill 1711 is
bad for big business (written as bad(1711)). This
is consistent with kbI ∪ kbA, and so clause (c)
is satisfied. Clause (b) is also satisfied, because
(i) α entails Bush vetoes bills that are bad for
big business—i.e., ⊥KB∧τ (α, φ) holds, where φ is
∀x((bill(x) ∧ bad(x)) > veto(bush, x)); (ii) β ∧ δ is
bill(1711) ∧ veto(bush, 1711) ∧ bad(1711); and so
(iii) instance(φ, β ∧ δ) and ⊥KB∧τ∧δ(β, β ∧ δ) both
hold.
So, when interpreting (1) in Context 1, two
rules apply: Narration and the Result Rule. But
the consequent of Narration already conflicts with
what is known; that the discourse relation be-
tween α and β must satisfy the Belief Property.
So the consequent of the Result Rule is inferred: δ
(i.e., House Bill 1711 is bad for big business) and
Result(α, β) .4
4 We could have a similar rule to the Result Rule for
inferring Evidence(α, β) in this discourse context too.
These rules show how (1) can make the knowl-
edge that the house bill is bad for big business
moot; one does not need to know that the house
bill is bad for big business prior to attempting dis-
course attachment. One can infer it at the time
when discourse attachment is attempted.
Now suppose that we start from different
premises, as provided by Context 2: BABIβ,
BA¬BIα and WABIα. That is, I thinks A be-
lieves that I believes Bush will veto the bill, and
I also thinks that A wants to convince him that
Bush supports big business. Then the ‘inten-
tional’ line of reasoning yields different results from
the same observed behaviour—A’s utterance of
(1). Using aps1 again, but substituting BIα for
φ instead of BIβ, I concludes BA(⊥kb(〈τ, α, β〉 ∧
Info(α, β), eventually(BIα)).
5 So Isupports(β, α)
holds. Now the antecedent to Cooperation is ver-
ified, and so in the monotonic component of ce,
we infer that α and β must be connected by a dis-
course relation R′ such that (BIβ ∧ R
′(α, β)) >
BIα. As before, this restricts the set of permit-
ted discourse relations for attaching β to α. But
unlike before, the textual order of α and β, and
their direction of intentional support mismatch.
The rule that applies this time is the Evidence
Rule. Consequently, a different discourse relation
is inferred, although the same information δ—that
House Bill 1711 is bad for big business—supports
the discourse relation, and is also be inferred.
In contrast, the antecedents of the Result and
Evidence Rules aren’t verified in (3). Assuming
I knows about the legislative process, he knows
that if George Bush is a weak willed president,
then normally, he won’t veto bills. Consequently,
there is no δ that is consistent with his kb, and
sanctions the Evidence or Result relation. Since I
cannot infer which of the permitted discourse re-
lations holds, and so by contraposing the axiom
Cooperation, α doesn’t Isupport β. And so I has
failed to conclude what A intended by his discourse
action. It can no longer be a belief that it will
eventually lead to I believing β, because otherwise
Isupport(α, β) would be true via the rule Intends
To Support. Consequently, I cannot infer what
5Given the new kb, the antecedent of aps1 would no
longer be verified if we substituted φ with BIβ.
discourse relation to use in attachment, yielding
incoherence.
FROM INFORMATION TO
INTENTIONS:
CONTEXT 3
Consider the interpretation of (1) in Context 3: I
has no knowledge of A’s communicative intentions
prior to witnessing his linguistic behaviour, but he
does know that the House Bill 1711 is bad for big
business. I has sufficient information about the
semantic content of α and β to infer Result(α, β),
via a rule given in Lascarides and Asher (1991):
• Result
(〈τ, α, β〉 ∧ cause(α, β)) > Result(α, β)
Result(α, β) has the Belief Property, and I reasons
that from believing α, he will now come to believe
β. Having used the information structure to in-
fer discourse structure, I must now come to some
conclusions about A’s cognitive state.
Now suppose that BABIα is in I’s kb. Then the
following principle of Charity allows I to assume
that A was aware that I would come to believe
β too, through doing the discourse attachment he
did:
• Charity: BIφ > BABIφ
This is because I has inferred Result(α, β), and
since Result has the belief property, I will come
to believe β through believing α; so substituting β
for φ in Charity, BABIβ will become part of I’s kb
via Defeasible Modus Ponens. So, the following is
now part of I’s kb:
BA(⊥ kb(〈τ, α, β〉 ∧ Info(α, β)), eventually(BIβ)).
Furthermore, the assumption that A’s discourse
behaviour was intentional again yields the follow-
ing as part of I’s kb: IA(〈τ, α, β〉∧Info(α, β)). So,
substituting BIβ and 〈τ, α, β〉 ∧ Info(α, β) respec-
tively for φ and ψ into the Practical Syllogism, we
find that clause (b) of the premises, and the con-
clusion are verified. Explanatory reasoning on the
Practical Syllogism this time permits us to infer
clause (a): A’s communicative goals were to con-
vince I of β, as required.
The inferential mechanisms going from discourse
structure to intentional structure are much less
well understood. One needs to be able to make
some suppositions about the beliefs of A before one
can infer anything about his desires to communi-
cate, and this requires a general theory of com-
monsense belief attribution on the basis of beliefs
that one has.
IMPERATIVES AND
PLAN UPDATES
The revision of intentional structures exploits
modes of speech other than the assertoric. For in-
stance, consider another discourse from Moore and
Pollack (1992):
(2)a.Let’s go home by 5.
b.Then we can get to the hardware store
before it closes.
c. That way we can finish the bookshelves
tonight.
Here, one exploits how the imperative mode af-
fects reasoning about intentions. Sincere Ordering
captures the intuition that if A orders α, then nor-
mally he wants α to be true; and Wanting and
Doing captures the intuition that if A wants α to
be true, and doesn’t think that it’s impossible to
bring α about, then by default he intends to en-
sure that α is brought about, either by doing it
himself, or getting someone else to do it (cf. Co-
hen and Levesque, 1990a).
• Sincere Ordering:
Imp(α) >WA(α).
• Wanting and Doing:
(WAα ∧ ¬BA¬eventually(Rα)) > IA(Rα)
These rules about A’s intentional structure help
us analyse (2). Let the logical forms of (2a-c) be
respectively α, β and γ. Suppose that we have
inferred by the linguistic clues that Result(α, β)
holds. That is, the action α (i.e., going home by
5pm), results in β (i.e., the ability to go to the
hardware store before it closes). Since α is an im-
perative, Defeasible Modus Ponens on Sincere Or-
dering yields the inference that WAα is true. Now
let us assume that the interpreter I believes that
the author A doesn’t believe that α’s being brought
about is impossible. Then we may use Defeasible
Modus Ponens again on Wanting and Doing, to in-
fer IA(Rα). Just how the interpreter comes to the
belief, that the author believes α is possible, is a
complex matter. More than likely, we would have
to encode within the extension of dice we have
made, principles that are familiar from autoepis-
temic reasoning. We will postpone this exercise,
however, for another time.
Now, to connect intentions and plans with dis-
course structure, we propose a rule that takes an
author’s use of a particular discourse structure to
be prima facie evidence that the author has a par-
ticular intention. The rule Plan Apprehension be-
low, states that if α is a plan that A intends to do,
or get someone else to do, and he states that δ is
possible as a Result of this action α, then the in-
terpreter may normally take the author A to imply
that he intends δ as well.
• Plan Apprehension:
(Result(α, β) ∧ IA(Rα) ∧ β = can(δ)) >
IA(R(α; δ))
We call this rule Plan Apprehension, to make clear
that it furnishes one way for the interpreter of a
verbal message, to form an idea of the author’s
intentions, on the basis of that message’s discourse
structure.
Plan Apprehension uses discourse structure to
attribute complex plans to A. And when attaching
β to α, having inferred Result(α, β), this rule’s an-
tecedent is verified, and so we infer that δ—which
in this case is to go to the hardware store before
it closes—as part of A’s plan, which he intends to
bring about, either himself, or by getting another
agent to do it.
Now, we process γ. That way in γ invokes an
anaphoric reference to a complex plan. By the ac-
cessibility constraints in sdrt, its antecedent must
[α; δ], because this is the only plan in the accessi-
ble discourse context. So γ must be the drs below:
as a result of doing this plan, finishing the book-
shelves (which we have labelled ǫ) is possible:
(γ)Result([α; δ], can(ǫ))
Now, substituting [α; δ] and ǫ for α and β
into the Plan Apprehension Rule, we find that
the antecedent to this rule is verified again, and
so its consequent is nonmonotonically inferred:
IA(R(α; δ; ǫ)). Again, I has used discourse struc-
ture to attribute plans to A.
Moore and Pollack (1992) also discuss one of I’s
possible responses to (2):
(4)We don’t need to go to the hardware store.
I borrowed a saw from Jane.
Why does I respond with (4)? I has inferred
the existence of the plan [α; δ; ǫ] via Plan Appre-
hension; so he takes the overall goal of A to be
ǫ (to finish the bookshelves this evening). Intu-
itively, he fills in A’s plan with the reason why
going to the hardware store is a subgoal: I needs
a saw. So A’s plan is augmented with another
subgoal ζ, where ζ is to buy a saw, as follows:
IA(R[α; δ; ζ; ǫ]). But since ζ holds, he says this
and assumes that this means that A does not have
to do α and δ to achieve ζ. To think about this for-
mally, we need to not only reason about intentions
but also how agents update their intentions or re-
vise them when presented with new information.
Asher and Koons (1993) argue that the following
schema captures part of the logic which underlies
updating intentions:
• UpdateIA(R[α1; . . . ;αn]),D(α1; . . . ;αj) |=
IA(R[αj+1; . . . ;αn]) ∧ ¬IA(R[α1; . . . ;αj ])
In other words, if you’re updating your inten-
tions to do actions α1 to αn, and α1 to αj are
already done, then the new intentions are to do
αj+1 to αn, and you no longer intend to do α1 to
αj.
The question is now: how does this interact with
discourse structure? I is attempting to be helpful
to A; he is trying to help realize A’s goal. We
need axioms to model this. Some key tools for
doing this have been developed in the past cou-
ple of decades—belief revision, intention and plan
revision—and the long term aim would be to en-
able formal theories of discourse structure to in-
teract with these formal theories of attitudes and
attitude revision. But since a clear understand-
ing of how intentions are revised is yet to emerge,
any speculation on the revision of intentions in a
particular discourse context seems premature.
CONCLUSIONS AND
FURTHER WORK
We have argued that it is important to sepa-
rate reasoning about mental states from reason-
ing about discourse structure, and we have sug-
gested how to integrate a formal theory of dis-
course attachment with commonsense reasoning
about the discourse participants’ cognitive states
and actions.
We exploited a classic principle of commonsense
reasoning about action, the Practical Syllogism, to
model I’s inferences about A’s cognitive state dur-
ing discourse processing. We also showed how ax-
ioms could be defined, so as to enable information
to mediate between the domain, discourse struc-
ture and communicative intentions.
Reasoning about intentional structure took a dif-
ferent form from reasoning about discourse attach-
ment, in that explanatory reasoning or abduction
was permitted for the former but not the latter
(but cf. Hobbs et al, 1990). This, we argued, was
a principled reason for maintaining separate rep-
resentations of intentional structure and discourse
structure, but preserving close links between them
via axioms like Cooperation. Cooperation enabled
I to use A’s communicative intentions to reason
about discourse relations.
This paper provides an analysis of only very sim-
ple discourses, and we realise that although we
have introduced distinctions among the attitudes,
which we have exploited during discourse process-
ing, this is only a small part of the story.
Though dice has used domain specific informa-
tion to infer discourse relations, the rules relate
domain structure to discourse structure in at best
an indirect way. Implicitly, the use of the dis-
course update function 〈τ, α, β〉 in the dice rules
reflects the intuitively obvious fact that domain in-
formation is filtered through the cognitive state of
A. To make this explicit, the discourse commu-
nity should integrate work on speech acts and at-
titudes (Perrault 1990, Cohen and Levesque 1990a,
1990b) with theories of discourse structure. In
future work, we will investigate discourses where
other axioms linking the different attitudes and
discourse structure are important.
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